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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Bank of Commerce (the "Bank") agrees that this is a case brought by the Bank to 
foreclose real estate mortgages against Appellant, Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, ("Jefferson"). 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below 
Jefferson's Course of Proceedings in its Appellant's Brief is, for the most part, accurate.] 
C. Statement of the Facts 
Corrections, clarifications and additions to the Statement of Facts as set forth in the 
Appellants' Brief are set forth below. Some of these facts are disputed but are added to provide 
context. However, even the disputed facts are not material and would not prevent summary 
judgment. 
Dustin Morrison ("Dustin,,)2 began looking for financing for Jefferson's Southern Hills 
Development project (the "Project") in December 2005, or perhaps even earlier than that. R. at 
Vol. I, p. 242-44, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 40, 11. 2-10, 17-19, p.45, 1. 24 to p. 46, 1. 2. At first, 
Dustin approached D.L. Evans Bank about getting a 2.8 million dollar loan for the Project. R. at 
Vol I, p. 244, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 46, 1. 3 to p. 48,1. 21. D.L. Evans Bank did not 
] However, Jefferson appears to make a typo in its Appellant's Brief in that it states: "The Bank filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the District Court to enter judgment in its favor, or in the alternative, to 
grant Jefferson partial summary judgment..." (Italics added.) Rather, the Motion for Summary Judgment requested 
that in the alternative the Bank be granted partial summary judgment. 
2 Dustin Morrison will be referred to throughout this Brief by his first name in order to avoid confusion 
with Sonya Morrison and A. Michael Morrison. No disrespect is intended. 
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necessarily deny Dustin's request for a loan, but it did not approve it the way he wanted it. Id. 
Thereafter, on April 21, 2006, Dustin met with Steve Worton ("Worton"), a loan officer 
at The Bank of Commerce, and Pam Wake at Pam Wake's office in the Key Bank building. 
Dustin presented the Project. Dustin gave Worton a binder of information that had tax returns, 
financial entities statements, an appraisal of the subject properti (referred to herein as the 
"Subject Property" or the "Southern Hills Development Property"), projected sales and other 
information Dustin believed was pertinent to the loan request. During this meeting, Worton 
asked Dustin about the Eighty Acres, Inc., mortgage which was on a portion ofthe Subject 
Property and whether the Bank would be able to obtain a first-position security interest in that 
portion of the property. Dustin represented at the meeting that he thought he could obtain a 
subordination from Eighty Acres, Inc., which would allow the Bank to be placed in first position 
on the entire Subject Property, including the Eighty Acres, Inc., portion of the property. After the 
meeting, Dustin took Worton out to the Southern Hills Development Property and they drove 
over the property. R. at Vol. I, p. 182-83, Aff. Worton, ~~ 3 & 5. 
From as early as at least April 21, 2006, the Bank's position was that its mortgage would 
need to be in first position for all property securing the loan to Jefferson, including the Eighty 
Acre, Inc., property, before the Bank would loan money to Jefferson. R. at Vol. I, p. 185, Aff. 
Worton, ~ 12. 
3 The Subject Property is made up of several parcels of real property, including a parcel known as the 
Eighty Acre Parcel and three parcels known as the Wood Property. 
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On May 3,2006, Worton met with Eric Polatis and Deena Green, who were officers at 
First American Title, to review the title commitment for the Project. Eric Polatis and Deena 
Green had some questions about the ability to put the Bank in first position on all of the land that 
Dustin had offered to secure the proposed loan from the Bank. Worton contacted Dustin by 
telephone and asked him to come to the First American Title office to clear up the liens on the 
property. When Dustin arrived he was shown the title commitment and prior lien holders. 
Dustin again indicated that the first lien holder would subordinate its lien position to the Bank's 
lien position. R. at Vol. I, p. 183, Aff. Worton, ~ 6. 
On May 8, 2006, the loan application package was submitted to the Bank's Loan Review 
Committee. R. at Vol. I, p. 184, Aff. Worton, ~ 7. 
Dustin knew that Worton did not have the authority to approve the loan that Jefferson 
was requesting. R. at Vol. I, p. 258-59, D. Morrison Depo. Tr. p. 105,1. 24 to p. 106, l. 1. In 
fact, any loan over $250,000.00 had to be approved by the officers and directors of the Bank in a 
formal meeting. R. at Vol. I, p. 175, Aff. Romrell, ~ 7. The May 9, 2006, meeting of the officers 
and directors of the Bank was the only time Jefferson's loan request was presented to the officers 
and directors of the Bank. R. at Vol. I, p. 175, Aff. Romrell '1\6. It was never presented at any 
prior meeting of the officers and directors of the Bank. Id. 
Prior to the evening of May 9, 2006, Dustin continued to represent that he believed he 
could get Eighty Acres, Inc., to subrogate its lien to the Bank's mortgage. R. at Vol. I, p. 186, 
Aff. Worton, 'Il13. 
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On May 9,2006, the Bank's Board of Trustees (the "Board") approved a loan to Jefferson 
for $2,200,000, rather than the requested $2,800,000. Worton called and visited with Morrison 
about the approval of this lesser amount. Again, Worton reiterated that the Bank's mortgage 
would need to be in first position for all acreage. Later that evening, Dustin called Worton and 
said he was unable to get Eighty Acres, Inc., to subordinate their lien position. Worton therefore 
informed Dustin that the Eighty Acres, Inc.' s lien obligation would need to be paid off before the 
Bank would be able to proceed with the loan. Dustin suggested a couple of ideas for how he 
could meet the Bank's requirement to be in first position. For example, Dustin suggested that the 
loan amount could be increased to cover the additional money needed to payoff the Eighty 
Acres, Inc., lien obligation. Dustin also stated that he could put cash into a certificate of deposit 
and hold it in the Bank as additional security until the Bank's loan committee had time to review 
his additional request for more money to pay off the Eighty Acres, Inc., lien. Dustin said he 
would go to work on getting money together to make all ofthis work out. Worton said he would 
have to talk to Tom Romrell ("Romrell"), the president ofthe Bank, to see if Dustin's 
suggestions would work. Worton told Dustin that he would call him the following morning after 
he had talked to Romrell. R. at Vol. I, p. 184, Aff. Worton, ~ 8. 
On May 10, 2006, Worton had an early morning telephone call with Romrell regarding 
Dustin's inability to place the Bank in first position on all of the secured property as the Board 
had required for the loan to be approved. Worton told Romrell about Dustin's idea to allow 
Dustin time the following week to get the Board's approval for an additional loan for funds to be 
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used to pay off the Eighty Acre, Inc., debt. Romrell was not in favor of paying offthe Eighty 
Acre, Inc., lien with an additional loan from the Bank. Instead, Romrell suggested that Dustin 
figure out a way to pay offthe Eighty Acres, Inc., lien without an additional loan from the Bank. 
Worton then called Dustin and informed him that his idea of obtaining another loan from the 
Bank to payoff the Eighty Acre, Inc., lien would not work as the Bank needed its mortgage to be 
in first position before it would make the $2,200,000 loan to Jefferson and that $2,200,000 was 
the limit that the Bank would loan on the Project. R. at Vol. I, p. 184-85, Aff. Worton, ~ 9. 
Later on May 10, 2006, Worton faxed a letter to the title company reiterating the Bank's 
position that its mortgage would need to be in first position. R. at Vol. I, p. 185, Aff. Worton, , 
10. 
Dustin was able to pay off the Eighty Acres, Inc., debt, and thus release its lien. 
Thereafter, Dustin and his wife Sonya Morrison ("Sonya") signed the Promissory Note and the 
Mortgage securing the note on May 10,2006, as members of Jefferson.4 The Mortgage placed 
the Bank in first position on all of the Subject Property, including the property that had 
previously been encumbered by Eighty Acres, Inc. Said Mortgage was recorded May 10, 2006, 
in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, under Instrument No. 20609793. The Bank, therefore, 
loaned Jefferson, $2,200,000 ($2,223,805.00 after including various charges) to purchase the 
Wood Property on May 10, 2006. R. at Vol. I, p. 185, Aff. Worton, ~ 11; R. at Vol. I, p. 189-90, 
4 Although the Mortgage was prepared on May 9,2006, it was not signed by Dustin and Sonya until May 
10, 2012, the day of the closing. 
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Aff. A. Michael Morrison, ~~ 5-6. 
At no time did Worton or any other employee of the Bank ever tell Morrison that the 
Bank would loan him additional money to pay off the Eighty Acres, Inc., lien. R. at Vol. I, p. 
186, Aff. Worton, ~ 14. 
Neither Dustin nor Sonya ever indicated to the Bank that they were going to use all of 
their liquid assets to pay off the Eighty Acres, Inc., lien. Neither Dustin nor Sonya ever indicated 
to the Bank that by paying off the Eighty Acres, Inc., lien, they and Jefferson would lose their 
ability to obtain other financing for this Project or for other projects. R. at Vol. I, p. 186, Aff. 
Worton, ~ 15. 
More than a year later, on June 27,2007, the Bank loaned to Jefferson the sum of Four 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00). As evidence ofthis second loan Jefferson made 
another Promissory Note in writing on June 27, 2007, in the principal sum of Four Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00). This second Promissory Note also sets forth interest to be paid 
by Jefferson. R. at Vol. I, p. 190, Aff. A. Michael Morrison, ~ 7. 
As security for the repayment of both the May 9,2006 loan and the June 27, 2007 loan, 
together with interest, costs and attorney fees, Jefferson made, executed and delivered to the 
Bank another Mortgage dated the June 27, 2007. Said Mortgage was recorded June 27, 2007, in 
the records of Bannock County, Idaho under Instrument No. 20715644. R. at Vol. I, p. 190, Aff. 
A. Michael Morrison, ~ 8. 
On or about February 21, 2008, both ofthe above-described Promissory Notes and both 
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of the above-described Mortgages were modified by the Bank and Jefferson pursuant to two 
separate Corporate Notes and Deed of TrustiMortgage Agreements to Amend Terms. As a result 
of the modifications, both Notes became due and payable in full on May 1,2008. R. at Vol. I, p. 
190, Aff. A Michael Morrison, ~ 9. 
The Bank is the owner and holder of said Notes and Mortgages. On May 1, 2008, 
Jefferson was in default in that it failed to pay the balance of said Notes. On August 1,2008, the 
Bank declared all sums owing under said Notes, Mortgages and related security documents due 
and payable in full. R. at Vol. I, p. 191, Aff. A Michael Morrison, ~ 10. 
As of July 15, 2008, Jefferson owed to the Bank under the terms and provisions of said 
Notes and Mortgages the sum of Two Million Seven Hundred Twenty-three Thousand Four 
Hundred Ninety-seven Dollars and Forty Cents ($2,723,497.40) calculated as follows: 
Principal balance due as of 7115/08 
Interest through 7115/08 
Total Principal and Interest due as of 7115/08 




Said Notes accrue interest at the combined per diem of$507.68548. R. at Vol. I, p. 191, 
Aff. A Michael Morrison, ~ 14. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Bank is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to contract and/or Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) and Rule 41, LAR. Furthermore, the Bank asks for costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 
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40, I.A.R. 
A. Attorney Fees Based on Contract 
The Bank is entitled to attorney fees and costs based on the Promissory Note dated May 
9,2006 (and executed on May 10,2006); the Mortgage dated on May 9,2006 (and executed on 
May 10,2006); the Promissory Note dated June 27,2007; and the Mortgage dated June 27, 2007 
(and executed on June 29, 2007). 
Both Notes provide: 
Collection Costs and Attorney's Fees - I agree to pay all costs of collection, 
replevin or any other or similar type of cost if I am in default. In addition, if you 
hire an attorney to collect this note, I also agree to pay any fee you incur with such 
attorney plus court costs ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 195 & 209. 
Both Mortgages provide: 
19. EXPENSES; ADVANCES ON COVENANTS; ATTORNEYS' FEES; 
COLLECTION COSTS. Except when prohibited by law, Mortgagor agrees to 
pay all of Lender's expenses if Mortgagor breaches any covenant in this 
Mortgage. Mortgagor will also pay on demand all of Lender's expenses incurred 
in collecting ... in respect to the Property. Mortgagor agrees to pay all costs and 
expenses incurred by Lender in enforcing or protecting Lender's rights and 
remedies under this Mortgage, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, court 
costs, and other legal expenses .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 199 & 213. 
The Bank was required to hire attorneys to enforce the Notes and the Mortgages. The 
Subject Property secures all amounts owed to the Bank pursuant to these documents, including 
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all attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. Therefore, this Court should award the Bank 
all of its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
B. Attorney Fees Based on Statute 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3), authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party on appeal in any civil action to recover on a note and in any commercial 
transaction. 
As this is an action to recover on the two Notes and because the underlying claim is based 
on a commercial transaction, the Court should award the Bank all of its attorney fees and costs 
on appeal. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Adjudication and Review 
In Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 (2007), the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
This Court's review of the district court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is the same as that required of the district court when ruling on the 
motion.... Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw. LR.C.P.56(c). 
(citations omitted.) 
"A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create 
a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." Id 
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The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party 
has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which 
it has the burden of proof. See Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 312, 882 P.2d 475, 479 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548,2552, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 
B. Breach of Contract 
1. Mortgage 
In its Appellant's Brief, Jefferson now argues that the Mortgage, which was prepared by 
the Bank on May 9, 2006, was a written agreement that provided that encumbrances of record, 
such as the Eighty Acre encumbrance, would have priority over the lien of the Bank's Mortgage. 
This argument fails for several reasons. First, it was not raised below, but is being raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
"To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the 
court below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal." McPheters v. l'v1aile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 
64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003) (citation omitted). Since this issue was not raised below, 
this Court will not consider this issue on appeal. 
Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 436,80 P.3d 1031,1037 (2003). 
Second, although the Mortgage was prepared by the Bank on May 9, 2006, it was not 
signed by Dustin and his wife, Sonya, until closing on May 10, 2006, by which time Dustin had 
already paid off the Eighty Acre encumbrance. R. at Vol I, p. 240, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 33, 
11. 2-7; Vol I, p. 185, Aff. Worton, ~ 11. Therefore, at the time the Mortgage was signed on May 
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10, 2012, the Eighty Acre encumbrance was no longer an encumbrance of record. 
Third, Dustin testified that he had not received any precommitment in writing that the 
Bank would take a second position in the Eighty Acre Parcel. R. at Vol I, p. 248-49, D. Morrison 
Depo. Tr., p. 64, 11. 1-13 and p. 67, 11. 9-13. Ultimately, Dustin decided that he would accept the 
terms that the Bank offered and close the loan by paying offthe Eighty Acre loan and placing the 
Bank in first position on the Eighty Acres. R. at Vol I, p. 250 & 256, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 
73,11. 20-22, p.95, 11. 6-8. Therefore, the Mortgage cannot be construed as any precommitment, 
but was rather part of the ultimate loan agreement, under which the Bank received a first lien 
position on the Eighty Acre Parcel. 
Fourth, the Mortgage cannot be an agreement to loan money on the terms that Jefferson is 
claiming, in particular that the Bank would take a second lien position on the Eighty Acre Parcel, 
because the Mortgage was not subscribed by the Bank. See the Statute of Frauds (I.C. § 9-505). 
This new argument that the Mortgage, signed by Dustin and Sonya on May 10, 2006, 
could somehow be an agreement that the Bank would take a second lien position in the Eighty 
Acre Parcel is not only raised for the first time on appeal, but it is not supported by any of the 
facts in the record. 
2. Statute of Frauds 
Jefferson claims that the Bank agreed to loan money to Jefferson in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the loan application, including the condition that the Bank would be 
secured on the Eighty Acre Parcel by taking a second lien position. Even when construing the 
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evidence in favor of Jefferson, the evidence does not support the breach of contract claim. 
Idaho Code § 9-505, which is referred to as the Statute of Frauds, requires that a promise 
or commitment to loan $50,000 or more must not only be in writing, but must also be subscribed 
by the alleged lender. There is no evidence that either requirement was met in the present case. 
Section 9-505 provides, in part, as follows: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some 
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, 
or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without 
the writing or secondary evidence of its contents: 
5. A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or extend credit in 
an original principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by 
a person or entity engaged in the business of lending money or extending credit. 
In Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005), Lettunich 
brought a claim against Key Bank for breach of an alleged oral agreement to loan him money. 
Lettunich had approached Key Bank to negotiate a loan package to purchase real property, cattle 
and an operating loan. Lettunich met with Key Bank's relationship manager, Brian Faulks, to 
explain the nature of his cattle operations and the type of financing he needed. The proposed 
financing package included three separate loans, each in excess of $50,000. Faulks sent 
Lettunich three written loan commitments. Lettunich signed the three loan commitments, but 
Key Bank never signed them. Lettunich bought cattle at a court-ordered sale on April 26, 2000, 
as he believed he was going to receive the three loans from Key Bank. On the evening of the 
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first day ofthe sale of cattle, Lettunich asked Faulks ifhe should continue to purchase cattle 
when the sale resumed the following day. Faulks encouraged Lettunich to keep buying the cattle 
and assured Lettunich that Key Bank would fund a term loan and operating line. Based on that 
representation, Lettunich continued buying cattle, ultimately purchasing over $400,000 in Angus 
cows. Thereafter, Key Bank refused to fund the cattle term loan and operating line of credit. 
Lettunich sued Key Bank for breach of an oral agreement, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing and fraud. The district court granted Key Bank summary judgment on the 
grounds that Lettunich's claims were barred by the statute of frauds. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the summary judgment. The Supreme Court recognized that each of the three loans 
negotiated by Lettunich exceeded $50,000. The Supreme Court stated: 
Lettunich argues there was an oral agreement between the parties. Viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to Lettunich, even if we infer there was an 
oral agreement between the parties at least as far as loaning money to purchase 
cattle, the oral agreement is invalid because it clearly violates I.e. § 9-505(5) .... 
Id. at 367,109 P.3d at 1109. 
In the present case, Dustin testified: 
Q. Now, back to this idea of, as you called it, kind of a 
precommitment given to you in writing? 
A. There was nothing given to me in writing. 
Q. So this precommitment idea that you are referring to again related 
to what you claim Steve Worton told you? 
A. Everything was related to what Steve Worton told me because 
there wasn't one think in writing, nothing. There wasn't an approval in writing, 
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there wasn't a list of conditions in writing, contingencies in writing. There wasn't 
a formal request in writing. Nothing was in writing. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 248, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 64, 11. 1-l3. 
Q. Nothing in ~Titing that said that the bank would take a second 
position in that property. 
A. No. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 249, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 67, 11. 11-l3. 
Jefferson requested a $2.8 million loan and ultimately received a $2.2 million loan. 
Because the alleged promise to lend money involved a loan much greater than $50,000, the 
Statute of Frauds governs Jefferson's breach of contract claim. In his deposition, Dustin 
admitted there was no written precommitment to loan Jefferson the money nor to take a second 
position in the Eighty Acre Parcel. As there was no such written precommitment, there logically 
was no such writing that was subscribed by the Bank or any of its agents. Because there was no 
such written and signed agreement, there can be no breach. 
3. No Consideration Paid for the Alleged Oral Precommitment to Loan 
Not only did the alleged commitment not comply with the Statute of Frauds, there was no 
consideration (commitment fee) to support a loan commitment, and therefore, no breach of any 
loan commitment. 
In D & M Dev. Co., Inc., v. Sherwood and Roberts, Inc., 93 Idaho 200, 457 P.2d 439 
(1969), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the use of a commitment fee to secure the right to 
later borrow money. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a commitment fee was not 
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interest and therefore did not violate the then-applicable usury statute. D & M Development 
Company had paid $56,250 as consideration for receiving three written loan commitments. The 
Court noted that "By the issuance of the three commitment letters, respondent was guaranteed the 
ability to borrow the rather large sum of money involved at a later date at a specific interest rate 
for a specific term." Id. at 206, 457 P.2d at 445. Additionally, the Court quoted Prather, 
Mortgage Loans and the Usuary Lmvs, 16 Bus. Lawyer 181 (Nov., 1960), which states: "The 
commitment fee buys a commitment; the fee paid is not 'for the use of money,' but for the 
privilege later of actually borrowing the money. It is an option, not a loan." 
In Lowe v. i"fassachusetts ~Mutual Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal.App.3d 718 (1976), the California 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that a commitment agreement constituted an 
option. The "trial court expressly found that under the terms of the commitment letter defendant 
was contractually obligated to lend $4,700,000 upon the applicant-assignor's compliance with 
the conditions stated in the letter of commitment". Id. at 724. The California Court of Appeals 
stated: 
'An option, when supported by consideration, ... is a Right acquired by 
contract to accept or reject a present offer within a limited time in the future .... ' 
'It is universally accepted that an option agreement is a contract distinct from the 
contract to which the option relates, since it does not bind the optionee to perform 
or enter into the contract upon the terms specified in the option." ... 
Id. at 725. 
In Justadv. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 512, 211 P.3d 118, 121 (2009), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the particular characteristics of an option contract, as follows: 
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F ormation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds as evidenced 
by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 
Idaho 701, 703, 779 P.2d 15, 17 (1989). This manifestation takes the form of an 
offer followed by an acceptance. Id. An option contract is an offer that, upon 
sufficient consideration, may not be revoked for an agreed upon amount of time. 
See 17 A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 53 (2d ed.2008). An acceptance of an option is 
an expression by the offeree that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of 
the offer. See IDJI 6.05.2. The acceptance is not complete until it has been 
communicated to the offeror. Id. Acceptance of an offer must be unequivocal. 
Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 909, 104 P.3d 946, 951 (2004). 
Generally, silence and inaction does not constitute acceptance. 17 A Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts § 98 (2d ed.2008). More specifically: 
Because assent to an offer that is required for the formation 
of a contract is an act of the mind, it may either be expressed by 
words or evidenced by circumstances from which such assent may 
be inferred, such as the making of payments or the acceptance of 
benefits. Anything that amounts to a manifestation of a formed 
determination to accept, and is communicated or put in the proper 
way to be communicated to the party making the offer, completes a 
contract. 
A response to an offer amounts to an acceptance if an 
objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a 
fully enforceable contract has been made, even if the offeree 
subjectively does not intend to be legally bound. This objective 
standard takes into account both what the offeree said, 'wrote, or 
did and the transactional context in which the offeree verbalized or 
acted. 
17 A AmJur.2d Contracts § 91 (2d ed.2008). 
In its Amended Counterclaim, Jefferson claims that the Bank initially committed to lend 
it money pursuant to Jefferson's loan application, including the taking of a second lien position 
on the Eighty Acre Parcel, but that the Bank later breached that commitment when it insisted on 
receiving a first lien position on the Eighty Acre Parcel. See Amended Counterclaim, ,;,; 10, 11, 
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17 and 19. 
However, these allegations are not supported by the facts. In his deposition, Dustin 
testified as follows: 
Q. Whenever it was, were you at that point committed to accept that 
loan from the Bank of Commerce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you had to accept the loan? 
A. In a practical sense, yes, because I had to perform by a certain date, 
and I hadn't been pursing a loan with anybody else. 
Q. But I am saying legally were you obligated 
A. No. 
Q. You weren't obligated to accept the loan that the bank gave you. 
A. Not legally; '" 
R. at Vol. I, p. 249, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 67, 1. 18 to p. 68, 1. 4 
Q. But you understand that the decision, whether the bank agrees to 
loan money or not, that's a decision they have; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They are not obligated to accept your proposal just because it's 
your proposal, are they? 
A. No, ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 250, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 70, 11. 7 to 13. 
Q. But you wanted 2.8 million as well; right? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you realize that what you want and what a lender may 
eventually approve are not always the same thing? 
A. Absolutely .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 249, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 70,1. 24 to p. 71,1. 2. 
Q. I'm saying did Jefferson Enterprises pay the bank any loan fee 
prior to closing? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 253, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 83,11. 7-9 
Q. At that time you had this pre approval. Did you pay something to 
the Bank of Commerce to hold that preapproval open? 
A. You have asked that four times. No money was paid prior to the 
loan fee. Nobody ever paid for a preapproval to a bank. 
Q. What was your understanding of the point in time that Jefferson 
Enterprises became obligated to the terms of the loan as offered by the Bank of 
Commerce? 
A. Legally the day we signed papers. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 253, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 85, 11. 13-22. 
From Dustin's own testimony, it is clear that there was no consideration paid for any loan 
preapproval or for any loan commitment. Dustin also testified that no such loan preapproval or 
loan commitment was in writing. The Bank had not given Jefferson any kind of option contract 
prior to closing and the loan agreement did not become binding on the parties until it was entered 
into by both parties at the closing on May 10, 2006. 
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4. No Evidence that the Bank Ever Agreed to a Second Lien Position on the Eighty Acres 
Furthennore, there is no evidence the Bank entered into any kind of commitment to loan 
money based on Jefferson's application for the loan. More specifically, there is no evidence the 
Bank agreed to only take a second position on the Eighty Acre Parcel. 
Dustin knew that Worton did not have the authority to approve the loan that Jefferson 
was requesting. R. at Vol. I, p. 258-59, D. Morrison Depo. Tr. p. 105,1. 24 to p. 106,1. l. In 
fact, any loan over $250,000.00 had to be approved by the officers and directors of the Bank in a 
fonnal meeting. R. at Vol. I, p. 175, Aff. Romrell, ~ 7. The May 9, 2006, meeting of the officers 
and directors of the Bank was the only time Jefferson's loan request was presented to the officers 
and directors of the Bank. R. at Vol. I, p. 175, Aff. Romrell ~ 6. It was never presented at any 
prior meeting of the officers and directors of the Bank. Id. Therefore, despite Dustin's belief 
that the Bank had given him a precommitment to loan him the money while agreeing to take a 
second position in the Eighty Acre Parcel, there is no evidence that the Bank ever offered or 
approved any such pre commitment. 
Because the evidence does not support any loan commitment prior to closing, there 
cannot be any breach of such a loan commitment. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
District Court's summary judgment dismissing Jefferson's breach of contract claim. 
C. Intentional Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage 
Jefferson claims the Bank's position requiring Jefferson to use existing liquid cash 
reserves to place the Bank in a first position on the Eighty Acre Parcel materially interfered with 
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Jefferson's foreseeable prospeetive economic advantage. See Amended Counterclaim, ~ 24. 
Speeifieally, Jefferson claims that the alleged interference "materially interfered with Jefferson's 
foreseeable prospective economic advantages stemming from the favorable existing financing on 
the property, the business opportunities of the related entities owned by the Morrisons and its 
ability to complete the Southern Hills project." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. However, the evidence 
simply does not support Jefferson's allegation of interference with a prospective economic 
advantage. 
Regarding the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
To establish a claim for intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage, Cantwell must show (1) the 
existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference 
inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was 
vvTongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference 
itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy 
has been disrupted. Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 
330,338,986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). The trial court granted 
summary judgment on this claim because Cantwell failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether or not the 
defendants engaged in a wrongful interference. The district court 
did not err. In a recent case, this Court denied a claim for tortious 
interference with contract because the plaintiff failed to establish 
the alleged interferer was a third party to the contractual 
relationship. See BECO Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, 145 Idaho 
719,724-26,184 P.3d 844, 849-51. The same result obtains here. 
Cantwell does not allege the defendants here acted outside the 
scope of their duties as Cantwell's supervisors. The actions of an 
agent are the actions of the corporation. Ostrander v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 
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950 (1993). An agent is only liable for actions which are outside 
its scope of duty to the corporation. Id. Since Cantwell fails to 
establish that the defendants acted outside the scope of their 
authority, he fails to show any wTongful interference. Since there 
is no third party to the relationship, Cantwell cannot state a claim 
for tortious interference. See Ostrander, 123 Idaho at 654, 851 
P.2d at 950; BECQ, 145 Idaho at 725-26, 184 P.3d at 850-51. 
Cantwell v. City a/Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 137-38, 191 P.3d 205, 215-16 (2005). 
To prevail on the third element, Jefferson must not only show that the Bank interfered 
with its economic expectancy, but that such interference was intentional. Jefferson attempts to 
shift the focus by claiming that the Bank interfered with its economic expectancy because the 
Bank knew Dustin used much of his cash to payoff the Eighty Acre encumbrance, thus reducing 
his working capital. However, this is not evidence of intentional interference. Even when 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Jefferson, the District Court determined that 
Jefferson had a valid economic expectancy (element # 1) and that the Bank was aware of it 
(element #2). However, there is no evidence that the Bank intentionally interfered in that 
expectancy or that the Bank's actions induced termination ofthe expectancy (element #3). 
Jefferson also failed to provide admissible evidence that the Bank's actions were wrongful 
(element #4) or that Jefferson suffered resulting damages (element #5). 
1. No Interference 
As part ofthe third element, Jefferson must show that the Bank interfered with the 
economic expectancy. However, as the District Court noted, it was Dustin who ultimately chose 
to use his working capital to pay off the Eighty Acre mortgage and to enter into the loan 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page - 21 
agreement with the Bank. 
Dustin testified: 
Q. Ultimately you decided that you would accept the terms that the 
bank offered and close the loan. 
A. yes .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 250, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 73, 11.20-22. 
Q. . .. but legally you could have walked away from that loan up until 
the minute you signed the documents. 
A. Certainly .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 254, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 86, 11. 4-6. 
A. 
So, no, my failure wasn't inevitable, it was absolutely unkno\vn, and I 
didn't know what the right thing to do was. And I begged Steve for counsel, I 
begged Tom for counsel. 
Q. Ultimately, though, the decision was yours. 
A. It was, .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 252, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 81, 11. 7-12. 
Q. Ultimately you had to decide what was best for you? 
A. I did, r did. 
Q. And you made a decision. 
A. I did. 
Q. And that decision as you said was not based on some promise of 
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future financing. 
A. No, ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 252-53, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 81, 1. 24 to p. 82,1. 6. 
The Bank did not interfere with Jefferson's economic expectancy. Rather, Dustin chose 
to accept the loan offered by the Bank. 
2. Not Intentional 
Also, as part of the third element, Jefferson must show that any interference by the Bank 
was intentional. However, Dustin's own testimony is that the Bank did not intentionally 
interfere. He testified as follows: 
Q. Do you have some basis to believe that the bank legally couldn't 
make this loan to you or 
A. No, it just seems completely unsound. It seems like you are loan 
sharking at that time. You are lending money anticipating failure and anticipating 
getting the land back. 
Q. Is that what you think the bank did? 
A. J don '( think the bank thought. ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 252, D. Morrison Depo Tr., p. 79, 11. 9-16 (emphasis added). 
It is impossible for the Bank's alleged interference to be intentional, if the Bank did not 
think. 
In addition, Dustin testified: 
Q. But do you believe that that was the motive that drove this 
supposed change as you call it? 
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A. I don't know for sure, but no, my gut and my instinct is that it was 
just simple negligence, the left hand didn't knmv what the right hand was doing, ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 257, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 100,11. 16-20 (emphasis added). 
Again, the Bank's conduct cannot be intentional if it was simply negligent. Negligence 
does not include an element of intentional conduct.5 
Dustin also testified: 
Q. But you don't have any facts that would support a belief that you 
can point to that cause you to say this was purposeful because of this? 
A. That's right. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 257, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 101, p. 16-19. 
"Intentionally" is defined as follows: "To do something purposely, and not accidentally or 
involuntarily .... " Black's Law Dictionary 560 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991). Since Dustin does not have 
any evidence that the Bank's conduct was purposeful, there is of course no evidence that its 
conduct was intentional. 
Jefferson's claim for intentional interference with an economic expectancy fails because 
there is no evidence that the Bank's alleged interference was intentional. 
5 "The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages." 
McPheters v. Maile. 138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). Intention is not an element of negligence. For 
this reason, there are differences between negligent and intentional torts, such as negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Relevant to the present case, Idaho has not recognized the 
tort of negligent interference with a prospective economic advantage. 
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3. The Bank's Actions Did Not Induce Termination of the Expectancy 
For argument's sake, even if the Bank did intentionally interfere with Jefferson's 
economic expectancy, the evidence does not support the requirement that such interference 
induced the termination of the expectancy. 
Dustin testified: 
Q. I think you referred to it as this beast. What did you mean by this 
beast? 
A. It's the biggest subdivision, it's the biggest master plan subdivision 
I believe at the time in Idaho, still by far in Southeast Idaho, in this market, in this 
world. I mean nothing originally nationally but extremely original for the 
community, for the area, for the state. 
Q. So it was kind of a cutting edge thing here 
A. For us, yes. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 238-39, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p.25, 1. 21 to p. 26, 1. 4. 
Q. Those were all unknowns going into it. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's kind of what development is all about, you get an idea, 
you see a project, you dump some money in, and you hope it turns out. 
A. Yes. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 241, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 35, 1. 25 to p. 36, 1. 5. 
Q. So you are saying that when you closed on this loan on May 10, 
that you knew that you wouldn't be able to keep the property, you didn't think you 
had any chance in the world of being able to come up vvith some plan to salvage 
this property? 
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A. No, that's not fair .... 
So, no, my failure wasn't inevitable, it was just absolutely unknown, and I 
didn't know what the right thing to do was .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 252, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 80,1. 11 to p. 81,1. 9. 
Q. . .. In Paragraph 15 you allege that Jefferson and other related 
entities lost the ability to take advantage of the foreseeable prospective economic 
opportunities related to the 80 Acres parcel, the Southern Hills projects, and other 
real estate developments. 
A. And this one wasn't truly foreseen, like to the extent that it 
impacted us, it wasn't foreseen or foreseeable \vith my set of knowledge. It was 
truly after we went out courting investors, them asking for financial statements 
and them seeing our weaknesses and defining our weaknesses as exactly what had 
just changed. 
Q. So you at the time, you didn't realize the impact it potentially could 
have, you said you later discovered 
A. r knew it would have an impact on my appeal to investors. I didn't 
fully appreciate how to the extent. 
R. at Vol. r, p. 256, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 95,1. 15 to p. 96, 1. 1. 
In fact, Dustin admitted that there are lots reasons why Jefferson ultimately failed. 
Regarding his decision to agree to the $2.2 million loan with the Bank, including giving the Bank 
a first lien position on the Eighty Acre Parcel, Dustin testified: 
A. 
r don't know if I made the best choice or not, I regret it some days and 
some days I think you guys were horrible. I don't know, it's definitely wrecked 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page - 26 
my life, it definitely has had an impact. I don't think it's solely due to the Bank of 
Commerce either, I think the market itself, the downturn in the market. Bank 
policy on spec construction and lending. Our own construction practices. A 
million things have played into it. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 258, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 104,11. 8-16. 
4. The Bank's Action Were Not Wrongful 
The fourth required element is that the alleged interference was wrongful by some 
measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an 
improper purpose or improper means). See Cantvvell, supra. Throughout his deposition Dustin 
testified that he didn't "think the bank thought", that he had not taken the position that the Bank 
purposely misled him, that he believed it was a case of simple negligence as the Bank's "left 
hand didn't know what the right hand was doing", that "Steve Worton never misled [him]" and 
that "Steve was forthright". R. at Vol. I, p. 252 & 257, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 79, 11. 15-16; p. 
99,11. 17-22; p. 100,11. 16-20; p. 100,1. 24 to p. 101,1. 1; p. 101,11. 7-8. Dustin also testified as 
follows: 
Q. . .. But is it your belief that when they supposedly gave you this 
precommitment that they knew at that time that they were going to change their 
position? 
A. No, I don't think. And you keep saying "they," understand the 
only contact was with Steve until the day before the loan and then that was with 
Steve and Tom. So "they" being Steve, no, I don't think that he had any intention 
of changing the game at the last minute. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 260, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 110, 1. 18 to p. 111, 1. 2. 
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Dustin testified: 
Q. Anything other than your experience in borrowing money that you 
rely on to make that statement that the bank deviated from recognized lending 
standards? 
A. No, I guess noL .. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 255, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 91,1. 25 to p. 92, 1. 4. 
Q. In Paragraph 15 you also allege that the bank committed other 
wrongful conduct. What other wrongful conduct do you believe the bank 
committed? 
A. I think that they should have considered one of the other options in 
order to mitigate the loss of the financing that was established and keep my 
balance sheet more sound .... 
Q. Other than [not] follow one of your recommendations, what other 
wrongful conduct did the bank engage in? 
A. I think they changed the terms at the last minute. I think they went 
through and closed a loan they had no business closing, none whatsoever. I think 
the whole process was wrong, there was nothing in writing, there was nothing 
stipulating to anything, there was nothing stipulating my request to the board. It 
was just my request, my binder. It's my binder. 
Q. Is there something in your mind legally, can you point me to 
something that says you can't do that? 
A. No, ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 255, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 92, 1. 18 to p. 93, 1. 16. 
Q. And, to your knowledge, does the bank's insistence that it have a 
first lien on the 80 Acres, is that somehow a violation of any statute that you are 
aware of? 
A. No. 
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Q. Is it a violation of any regulation or rule that you are aware of? 
A I think like you said, they can ask for whatever they want. They 
can ask for my first born, I guess, if they want. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 259, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 106, 11. 2-11. 
Ultimately, Dustin decided he would accept the terms the Bank offered and close the 
loan. R. at Vol. I, p. 250, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 73,11. 20-22. 
Even when construing the facts in favor of Jefferson, there is no evidence to support the 
fourth element that the Bank's insistence upon receiving a first priority lien position in the Eighty 
Acre Parcel was wrongful. 
Furthermore, although a lender can be liable for failure to loan money pursuant to a valid 
written agreement to loan money, the Bank can find no authority to support the proposition that, 
in the absence of a valid contract, a lender can be liable for damages for failure to loan money on 
the terms and conditions applied for by a potential borrower. Dustin acknowledged that it was 
the Bank's decision whether or not it would agree to loan money, the Bank was not obligated to 
accept his proposal just because it was his proposal, and what he wanted and what a lender might 
eventually approve are not the same thing D. Morrison, Depo Tr., p. 70,1. 7-13; p. 70,1. 24 to p. 
71,1.2. 
Just as the Bank cannot be liable for refusal to loan money under the terms that Dustin 
had requested, the Bank cannot be liable for damages that may have resulted when it loaned 
money to Jefferson under different terms because Dustin agreed to those different terms. It is 
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impossible for the Bank to be liable for damages for having fulfilled its side of the contract to 
loan money as agreed upon by the parties. The Bank's actions ofloaning the $2.2 million under 
the agreed upon terms of the loan cannot be construed as wrongful for purposes of Jefferson's 
claim of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. 
5. No Evidence of Resulting Damages 
Finally, the fifth element necessary to prove a claim of intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage is resulting damages. See Highland Enterprises, supra. Again, 
Jefferson has failed to provide any evidence to support its alleged damages. 
Dustin has testified that at the time of the loan, "[his] failure wasn't inevitable, it was just 
absolutely unknown, ... " R. at Vol. I, p. 252, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 81.,11. 7-8. Furthermore, 
the ultimate decision whether or not to take the loan from the Bank to payoff the Eighty Acre 
mortgage and to place the Bank into first position on the Eighty Acre Parcel was made by Dustin. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 250-51 & 256, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 73,11. 20-22; p. 81,1. 24 to p. 82, 1. 3; p. 
95,11. 6-8. Up until he signed the loan documents, Dustin admitted that he could have walked 
away from the loan. R. at Vol. I, p. 254, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 86,11. 4-6. Dustin testified 
that he doesn't know ifhe made the best choice or not. R. at Vol. I, p. 258, D. Morrison Depo. 
Tr., p. 104, 1. 8. He admits that the impact his decision has had on his life is not solely due to the 
Bank of Commerce, but "[a] million things have played into it." R. at Vol. I, p. 258, D. Morrison 
Depo. Tr., p. 104,11. ] 1-16. Therefore, there is no evidence that Jefferson's alleged damages 
were caused by the Bank. 
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"A district court's award of damages will be upheld on appeal where there 
is sufficient evidence supporting the award." Griffith 1, 143 Idaho 733, 740,152 
P.3d 604, 611 (2007) (quoting Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774,118 P.3d 
99, 106 (2005)). This Court has held that evidence is sufficient if it proves the 
damages with reasonable certainty. Griffith I, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611. 
"Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical 
exactitude; rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of 
damages from the realm of speculation." Id. 
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162,1167 (2009). 
Dustin testified: 
Q. How did you calculate the damages that you think that you suffered 
as a result of the bank's conduct? 
A. I don't know. This got me in trouble on the last one, too, I don't 
know what my damages are. I don't know what my damages are. I don't know 
the amounts of them yet because I am not that comfortable with the reconciliation. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 256, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 97, 11. 16-24. 
There is no evidence upon which a trier of fact could fix the amount of Jefferson's 
claimed damages. The only way damages could be calculated in the present case is by conjecture 
and speculation. Dustin does not know what his damages are. Dustin admitted that he was not 
competent to determine the amount of damages when he testified that "you would need 
somebody a little bit smarter than me to define that number". R. at Vol. I, p. 257, D. Morrison 
Depo. Tr., p. 98, 11. 8-9. Therefore, by his own admission, he is not competent to testify as to the 
amount of damages. Jefferson did not support its objection to the Bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment with any affidavit from any expert witness. There is no evidence in the record 
supporting the amount of damages allegedly suffered by Jefferson. Therefore, Jefferson has 
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failed to provide any evidence to support the fifth required element of its claim for intentional 
interference with an economic advantage. 
D. Fraud and Misrepresentation 
Jefferson claims that the Bank fraudulently misrepresented that it would accept a second 
lien position on the Eighty Acre Parcel and then allegedly changed its position less than 48 hours 
before the loan closing and the expiration of the option to purchase the Wood Property by 
insisting on a first lien position. In addition, Jefferson claims that the Bank fraudulently 
misrepresented that it would provide additional financing in the future, but that the Bank 
subsequently refused to provide that additional financing. 
The Bank should be granted summary judgment on this fraud and misrepresentation issue 
for two reasons. First, Jefferson has failed to plead fraud and misrepresentation with particularity 
as is required. See Rule 9(b), l.R.c.P. Second, Jefferson has failed to establish all of the 
elements required to establish a claim for fraud or misrepresentation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the requirements for fraud, as follows: 
A claim of fraud requires the plaintiff to establish nine elements with 
particularity: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that 
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) 
reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 223, 192 P.3d 1036, 1047 (2008). 
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1. No Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding the Bank's Request to Be in First Priority 
Lien Position on the Eighty Acre Parcel 
In order to establish fraud or misrepresentation, Jefferson would need to set forth 
evidence that when Worton allegedly told Dustin that the Bank: initially had approved the loan by 
agreeing to take a second priority lien position in the Eighty Acre Parcel, that the Bank and/or 
Worton knew that such a statement was false and that the Bank: would really only agree to a first 
priority lien position in the Eighty Acres Parcel. However, there is no evidence to support 
Jefferson's claim that the Bank's alleged original representation that it would take a second 
priority lien position was false at the time it was allegedly made. Nor is there any evidence that 
the Bank knew such alleged representation was false at the time it was allegedly made. 
In regards to what Jefferson claims was the precommitment, Dustin testified as follows: 
A. '" I meet with Steve Worton, Steve Worton says I think we can get 
you what you want.. .. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 246, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 56, 11. 22-24. 
Q. I want to go back, I don't want to spend a lot of time on this April 
25, I know it's not the exact date, but this precommitment. That was just we think 
we might be able to get something approved, I mean it was 
A. No, it was more than that. 
Q. Not in writing but-
A. I believe there was an interest rate expressed. I believe that there 
was a condition or a change from my application that was spelled out in the 
amount, the loan amount, not 2.8, we will do 2.2. No other conditions. And the 
term, one year. That's it, that's it. 2.2 for one year. 
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The words weren't saying everything else in your application or loan 
request are acceptable or approved, but there was certainly the effort to clarifY the 
changes to my loan request and application. 
Q. So they were telling you what they thought the changes would have 
to be. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In order to even have the board approve that loan. 
A. It was more than that, it was somebody had said we could do this. 
{( everything checks out, after due diligence, if everything checks out as you 
implied, we could do this, it was that far. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 253, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 83,1. 10 to p. 84,1. 14 (emphasis added). 
Regarding the issue of whether the Bank purposefully misled Jefferson, Dustin testified 
as follows: 
Q. In Paragraph 19 of your counterclaim you state that the change of 
position of the bank, and this is talking about the change in 80 Acres financing, 
was timed in such a manner that Jefferson was unable to seek alternate financing 
to exercise the option to purchase the Wood property. 
Is it your position that the bank purposely misled you, kind of led you 
along to that point and then kind of hit you below the belt? 
A. I haven't said that and you didn't read that in that Paragraph 19, 
that is a presumption you just jumped on. 
Q. No, I am just asking 
A. I would say minimum negligently and I don't know, I don't know, 
you know ... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 257, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 99,11. 17-25. 
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A. ... Like you said, I am not saying that I have any evidence, there is 
nothing in writing, I'm not I am just saying that, yeah, there could be some 
motivation for the bank getting this piece of property back under those terms. 
Q. But do you believe that that was the motive that drove this 
supposed change as you call it? 
A. I don't know for sure, but, no, my gut and my instinct is that it was 
simple negligence, the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing, and 
that Tom's arrogance wouldn't consider something that would mitigate its impact 
on me. It was absolute negligence at least. 
Q. You don't feel like Steve Worton was purposely trying to mislead 
you 
A. I don't think Steve Worton misled me .... I think Steve was 
forthright, I think Steve was as frantic as I was those two days before to clarify 
with Tom the board's intention. 
Q. You are saying it wasn't purposeful, you don't think it was -
A. I'm not saying it wasn't purposeful. I am saying I don't think that 
it was but I don't know. I want that answer to be enough. 
Q. But you don't have any facts that would support a belief that you 
can point to that caused you to say this was purposeful because of this? 
A. That's right. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 257, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 100,1. 11 to p. 101,1. 19. 
Dustin did not believe that when the Bank, through Worton, supposedly gave him the 
precommitment that the Bank had any intention of changing the game at the last minute. R. at 
Vol. I, p. 260, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 110, 1. 17 to p. 111, 1.1. 
In addition, Dustin knew that Worton did not have the authority to approve the loan. 
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Therefore, Dustin knew that any representation by Worton regarding the Bank's priority of the 
Bank's lien position would ultimately have to be approved by the Bank's board of directors. 
Therefore, it was not reasonable to rely on any alleged statement from Worton that the Bank 
would agree to a second lien position on the Eighty Acre Parcel prior to the Board of Directors' 
actual approval of such. Dustin testified: 
Q. During your discussions with Steve Worton, did you understand 
that Steve Worton didn't have authority by himself to approve this loan? 
A. I felt that he did. 
Q. What was it that led you to believe that he-
A. I'm sorry, strike that, that's not right. I felt he had the authority to 
represent the bank. In fact I somewhat knew that. Whether that was right or 
wrong, I don't know, but I knew at that point that Steve had authority to represent 
the bank. 
Q. But you knew he had to go get approval from the board of directors 
on a loan of this size. 
A. Yes. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 258-59, D. Morrison Depo. Tf., p. 105,1. 14 to p. 106,1. 1. 
Based on Dustin's own testimony, Worton did not know that his alleged false statement 
concerning the Eighty Acre Parcel was false. There is no evidence that anyone at the Bank, 
besides Worton, made any such representation. There is no evidence that the Bank knew that 
Worton's alleged statement was false. Moreover, Dustin knew that Worton did not have the 
authority to approve the loan, but that the Bank's board of directors would have to approve it. 
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Therefore, Jefferson's claim of fraud and misrepresentation regarding the lien position in the 
Eighty Acre Parcel is not supported by the evidence. 
2. No Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Additional Future Loans 
Additionally, the Amended Counterclaim alleges that the Bank fraudulently 
misrepresented that it would subsequently provide additional financing. Again, the admissible 
evidence does not support such a claim. Dustin testified as follows: 
A. ... Steve says there is no way the bank wants you to fail, there is no 
way that the Bank wants this as an asset. So do whatever you think is the right 
thing for you to do, but if you do this, my hunch is that you will be able to come 
back into this bank and they will consider whatever your loss was. 
So we did that, and we did come back into the bank several months later 
with applications for construction money to continue our operation in Stone Creek 
Estates and were denied that. And we brought that in at the encouragement of 
Steve. 
So we moved forward understanding that it would be the bank's effort to 
mitigate this impact of this new requirement on our business. 
Q. And that's based on what you claim Steve Worton told you? 
A. He didn't say those words, but yes. 
Q. And did he give you something in \\-Titing to that effect? 
A. He didn't give me anything in \\-Titing for anything. 
Q. So as I understand what you said, these are operating funds you 
think he was promising you? 
A. No. The ability to operate without those funds. I don't think he 
was promising it, I think he was using some common sense argument that there is 
no way that the bank won't do this. 
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Q. So you didn't view that as a loan commitment from the bank? 
A. No, I didn't.. .. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 250, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 72, 1. 12 to p. 73,1. 17. 
Q. Now, you say you thought there would be. Are you saying there 
was a commitment on the part of the bank? 
A. No. 
Q. That's just what you thought would happen. 
A. yes .... 
R. at Vol. I, p. 251, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 74, 11. 6-11. 
Q. That wasn't a commitment of Steve Worton or anybody else at the 
bank, that's just what you thought. 
A. That's right.. .. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 251, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 74, 11. 19-2l. 
Q. And you made a decision. 
A. I did. 
Q. And that decision as you said was not based on some promise of 
future financing. 
A. No, but it was a consideration of those things. 
Q. Those are factors you considered. 
A. Yes, consideration. 
Q. But not a legal commitment on the part of the bank to provide 
financing. 
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A. Sure, that's right.. .. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 253, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 82,11. 2-12. 
Based on Dustin's testimony, the only inference can be that the Bank did not make any 
false statement to Jefferson regarding a commitment for future financing. 
In Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal.App.3d 38,248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), the 
California Court of Appeal reviewed a similar case in which various persons sued a bank because 
the bank had allegedly promised to provide future long-term loans, but subsequently refused to 
extend those loans. One of the plaintiffs, Irene Kruse, sued the bank claiming fraud. The 
appellate court stated: 
The theory advanced at trial was that the Bank fraudulently induced Mrs. Kruse to 
execute the transfer of stock by misrepresenting to Mrs. Kruse that long-term 
financing would then be provided .... 
It seems obvious that Mrs. Kruse's central complaint is not the Bank's 
fraudulent inducement but rather the Bank's refusal to provide long-term 
financing for the O'Connell Company .... 
Yet, contrary to her assertions, the record contains no evidence of a 
"commitment" or "promise" to make such long-term loan. Unlike the Jewells, at 
trial Mrs. Kruse conceded there was no contract to lend money, since no terms 
had been negotiated. The thrust of her argument is directed to the Bank's conduct 
in 1977 and 1978 as the basis of an implied representation that the Bank would 
fund a long-term loan when in fact it had no intention to do so. The argument 
fails under its own weight, the record reflecting an absence of any substantial 
evidence supporting either an implied promise to lend money or the essential 
requirement of justifiable reliance. 
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At most, Sullivan [the bank's loan officer] expressed interest in securing 
the desired financing. As previously discussed, he and George M. Jewell 
engaged in ongoing discussions and negotiations for the purpose of obtaining the 
necessary loan approval from Sullivan's superiors, a prospect long incubating 
within George M. Jewell's hopeful expectation, an optimism he quickly shared 
with Mrs. Kruse and her son. Yet, George M. Jewell's optimism was unfounded. 
He knew that Sullivan lacked authority to approve the sizable loan necessary to 
fund the dehydration plant. The very premise of their frequent discussions was 
the need to obtain the approval of the regional office. In fact, the stock transfer in 
response to Sullivan's request was purportedly a step towards facilitating the 
needed approval. It is indisputable that the regional office's approval was 
recognized by both the Jewells and the O'Connells as a condition precedent to the 
Bank's expected commitment to extend long-term financing. The evidence of 
such contingent expectations and negotiations is far removed from a binding 
promise to lend money and also negates any reasonable reliance upon the Bank's 
alleged misrepresentations. 
Id. at 62-64,248 Cal. Rptr. at 231-33. 
Similarly, Jefferson is claiming that the Bank fraudulently induced it to enter into the $2.2 
million loan on May 10, 2006, by misrepresenting to Dustin that long-term financing would later 
be provided. However, the evidence does not support fraud or misrepresentation. Jefferson 
knew that any future loans from the Bank would have to be negotiated to determine the tem1S of 
any such loans. Jefferson also knew that the Bank's board of directors would have to approve of 
any such loans. Dustin testified: 
Q. What was the commitment? 
A. I think the commitment was a little bit ambiguous versus how you 
are trying to package it. And I am aware of what that sounds like. The 
commitment was the bank will do whatever it can to facilitate your success. 
Q. And this commitment was, again, verbally from Mr. Worton? 
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A. Yes. And it was assuming the bank's logic-
Q. So the bank would have to approve it. 
A. Yes. And probably define terms and all of those things, you know. 
Q. So none ofthat was decided or discussed. 
A. That's right. The commitment was broad and more in principle, 
you know, the bank will do what it can to facilitate your success with this project 
and continued income. 
Q. I mean there wasn't this discussion, where you said, okay it would 
be this much money for this long, for this interest rate or 
A. That's right, you are right. 
R. at Vol. I, p. 254, D. Morrison Depo. Tr., p. 88, 11. 4-24. 
The evidence of such contingent expectations and negotiations is far removed from a 
binding promise to lend money and also negates any reasonable reliance upon the Bank's alleged 
misrepresentations. See Kruse, supra. Therefore, Jefferson's fraud and misrepresentation claim 
fails. 
E. Promissory Estoppel 
Jefferson alleges promissory estoppel and now claims the District Court erred when it did 
not consider the specific terms and conditions ofthe Mortgage that allowed prior encumbrances 
of record, including the Eighty Acre encumbrance. 
As discussed above, Jefferson's argument that the Mortgage allowed for the security to 
have prior encumbrances of record, including the Eighty Acre encumbrance, was raised for the 
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first time on appeal, and therefore should not be considered. See Garner, supra. 
Also, as set forth in detail above, there was no valid loan commitment prior to the closing 
on May 10, 2006. As such the Bank should not be estopped from denying a nonexistent 
agreement which would have violated the Statute of Frauds and to which the Bank's board of 
directors never consented. 
Apparently a similar argument was made in Lettunich. supra. In that case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed promissory estoppel in a similar context as the present case. The Court 
stated: 
Lettunich argues promissory estoppel should be used in this case to 
prevent KeyBank from denying the enforceability of an oral promise. Again, 
there was no complete promise here to be enforced. Promissory estoppel is 
simply a substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between 
parties. Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 417, 422 
(1981). Consideration includes "action by the promisee which is bargained for 
and given in exchange for the promise." Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 
605,607,428 P.2d 524, 526 (1967). It may also consist of a "detriment to the 
promisee or a benefit to the promisor." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel 
i.,,1ortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 603, 514 P.2d 594,598 (1973) (citations omitted). 
In this case, Lettunich clearly suffered a detriment when he purchased cattle 
without a way to pay for them. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no 
consequence in this case because there is evidence of adequate consideration. 
What is lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement. Black Canyon Racquetball v. 
First Nat 'I, 119 Idaho 171, 178, 804 P.2d900, 907(1991). 
Lettunich. 141 Idaho at 367-68, 109 P.3d at 1109-10. 
Similarly, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable to Jefferson's claims. The 
issue is not whether there was adequate consideration for the alleged oral loan commitment. Even 
if there were adequate consideration for the alleged oral loan commitment, such a commitment 
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would still not have been valid or definite because it was not in v,Titing and because it was not 
subscribed by the Bank. As argued above, any such oral loan commitment would have violated 
the Statute of Frauds. 
Therefore, this Court should grant the Bank summary judgment by dismissing Jefferson's 
promissory estoppel claim. 
F. Damages 
Jefferson has not provided any foundation upon which its claimed damages can be 
calculated. The Bank's arguments, set forth above, regarding the speculative nature of 
Jefferson's alleged damages, apply not only to the intentional interference with a prospective 
economic advantage claim, but to all of Jefferson's theories of liability. 
G. Novation 
Even if there were a valid oral pre-loan commitment that would place the Bank in a 
second lien position on the Eighty Acre Parcel, as alleged by Jefferson, such a pre-loan 
commitment would have been superceded by the actual v,Titten loan documents that were 
executed by the parties on May 10, 2006. Therefore, the actual loan would be a novation of any 
alleged oral preapproval agreement. Additionally, in conjunction with the subsequent $400,000 
loan by the Bank to Jefferson, another Promissory Note and another Mortgage were executed by 
Jefferson more than a year later on or about June 27, 2007, which again placed the Bank in a first 
priority lien position. Moreover, the Promissory Notes and Mortgages were modified by the 
Bank and Jefferson pursuant to the two Corporate Notes and Deed of Trust/Mortgage 
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Agreements to Amend Terms that were executed on or about February 21, 2008. As a result of 
the modifications, both Notes became due and payable in full on May 1, 2008. Again, these 
modifications acted as a novation of the original loan documents which were executed by the 
parties on May 10, 2006. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the concept of a novation as follows: 
A novation results when an accord and satisfaction is reached by 
substitution of a new agreement or performance in place of the performance or 
compromise of the original obligation. Thus, novation is a species of accord and 
satisfaction. 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 5, p. 465; T¥heeler v. Wardell, 
173 Va. 168,3 S.E.2d377 (1939). It is stated in Wheelerv. Wardell, supra, that 
novation is a contract consisting of two stipulations; first, to extinguish an 
existing obligation and, secondly, to substitute a new one in place ofthe original. 
The court stated: 
"Every novation embraces, necessarily, an accord and satisfaction; 
the principle distinguishing feature between them being that a 
novation implies the extinguishment of an existing debt by the 
parties thereto and its transition into a new existence between the 
same or different parties, whereas an 'accord and satisfaction' 
relates solely to the extinguishment of the debt or obligation." 
To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties accepting a new or 
different obligation must do so knowingly and intentionally. Heckman v. Boise 
Valley Livestock Comm 'n Co., 92 Idaho 862,452 P.2d 359 (1969); Fairchild v. 
}.1athews, 91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43 (1966); Allan Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89 
Idaho 29,402 P.2d 394 (1943). An accord and satisfaction may be implied from 
the attendant circumstances. Independent School Dist. Class A, Number One v. 
Porter, 39 Idaho 340, 228 P. 253 (1924); Fairchildv. Mathews, supra; Winn v. 
Rudy-Patrick Seed Co., 249 Iowa 431, 86 N.W.2d 678 (1957); Scott v. Imperial 
Hotel Co., 75 Ga.App. 91, 42 S.E.2d 179 (1947). 
Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884, 886, 556 P.2d 67,69 (1976). 
To the extent there was a pre-loan representation as alleged by Jefferson, it was 
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subsequently modified by a series of novations. Therefore, Jefferson's claim that the Bank 
breached the oral pre-loan commitment should be dismissed as any such agreement was 
subsequently extinguished and substituted by the written $2.2 million loan agreement entered 
into on May 10, 2006, as well as the other subsequent novations. 
H. Affirmative Defense 
Jefferson also states that it "raised an affirmative defense in its Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim (the illegality of the Bank's actions) that was not addressed by the Bank: in its 
motion for summary judgment or the District Court in its decision dismissing Jefferson's 
counterclaim". See App. Brief, at 1. 
Jefferson did not raise the illegality of the Bank's actions in its Amended Answer and 
Counterclaims. Rather, Jefferson claimed as an affirmative defense that "[t]he Defendants are 
entitled to declare the note and mortgage null and void due to its illegality." R. at Vol. I, p. 121. 
In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Bank argued it was 
entitled to foreclose both of its Mortgages and that it held the highest priority on the Subject 
Property. R. at Vol. I, p. 150. The Bank set forth the background and foundation for the 
Promissory Notes and Mortgages that are the subject of this case in the Affidavit of A. Michael 
Morrison. R. at Vol. I, pp. 188-228. Dustin, the owner, manager and currently only member of 
Jefferson, testified that he understood that Jefferson became legally obligated to the terms of the 
loan which was offered by the Bank on the day he and Sonya signed the papers. R. at Vol. I, p. 
252, D. Morrison Depo. p. 85,11. 19-23. 
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Jefferson did not argue in its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment nor in any of its briefs supporting its Motion to Reconsider that the 
Mortgages were illegal. Neither did Jefferson provide any evidence that the Mortgages were 
illegal. 
The District Court stated: "The Court further finds that the Plaintiff holds two mortgages 
that encumber the Wood property and the 80 Acre parcel respectively. That Defendant Jefferson 
did not present any evidence or objection to the Bank's request to foreclose on the mortgages." 
R. at Vol III, p. 651, Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 19. 
In Butters v. Valdez, 149 Idaho 764, 770, 241 P.3d 7,13 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals stated: 
If a motion for summary judgment is supported by a particularized 
affidavit, the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his 
pleadings. The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions 
that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment -he must set 
forth, by affidavit or deposition, "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. A mere 
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. If a party 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be granted. 
(Internal citations omitted.) 
Therefore, because Jefferson only raised the issue of illegality in its Amended Answer, 
but did not address or support that issue in its subsequent briefs or affidavits, and because the 
Bank did set forth a foundation for the Promissory Notes and Mortgages in its affidavits, the 
District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Bank and allowing it to foreclose 
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on its Mortgages. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Even when construing the evidence in Jefferson's favor, Jefferson has failed to make a 
sufficient showing on the essential elements of its claims of breach of contract, intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage, fraud and misrepresentation, promissory 
estoppel, and damages as well as its affirmative defense of illegality. The Bank did support its 
foreclosure claims with uncontroverted evidence. There is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the Bank is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Bank. 
The Bank should be granted its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this ~----+-_ day of November, 2012. 
L'BTT\0260, 45 5 AppeaJ\Respondent's Brief v'!pd 
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